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PRESIDING JUDGE CARTER: [....]Exhibit 515-A will be admitted in evidence 
subject to the usual limitations t[sic] at we place on evidence of this 
kind. 
 
MR. RAPP: If your Honors will now please turn to page 4 ofDocument Book 
23 and page 5 in the German Document book, your Honors,this is a 
deposition by Egil Sorensen to the Norwegian Police of Vadsoedescribing 
the destruction and killing of Sorensen's wife by members of the German 
Wehrmacht. 
 
DR. FRITSCH: Your Honor, I would ask the prosecution to tell meagainst 
whom this document is directed. I have pointed out already thatthe navy 
which is charged here and who is supposed to have committedsome 
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act-- was not subordinate to the defendant Rendulic. 
 
MR. RAPP: Your Honors, as to the argumentation of defense counsel,we will 
show later on and tie this document up that the defendantRendulic as a 
matter of fact at that time commanded all German unitswithin the German 
Wehrmacht in Norway in his capacity as armed forcescommander Norway and 
commanding General 20th Mountain Army. 
 
PRESIDING JUDGE CARTER: I am wondering whether this deposition iswithin 
scope of the indictment against the defendant Rendulic withregard to his 
conduct in Norway. 
 
MR. RAPP: That is correct, your Honor; the area involved is in Finnmark, 
the Lakesfjord, and is part of the evacuation conducted by the 20th 
Mountain Army at that time. 
 
PRESIDING JUDGE CARTER: The point I make is, he is not charged withany 
responsibility for killing anybody in Norway under theindictment, isn't 
that correct? 
 
MR. RAPP: Your Honors, I believe the indictment states that inconnection 
with the evacuation, several hundred people suffered death.At least 
61,000 people were evacuated, or 31,000 people forcefully and,in 
connection with this, hardship and death was brought on the Norwegian 
population. 
 
PRESIDING JUDGE CARTER: It is the opinion of the Tribunal that 
theprobative value is rather questionable, but rather than try 
todetermine that now, we will permit it to go in and deal with it at 
theproper time. 
 
MR. RAPP: Very well, your Honor. May I call your Honor's attentionto the 
fact that this particular document is only submitted here as anexcerpt, 
but we have furnished &mdash; and the original document is inNorwegian 
and we have only translated into German and English up toyesterday 
&ndash; that part which we are submitting into evidence but I 
havemeanwhile furnished defense counsel the complete translation of 
thisNorwegian document for his use. 
 
PRESIDING JUDGE CARTER: I think under those circumstances you canread 
what parts you want to as long as you provide the balance to the 
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MR. RAPP: Very well, your Honor. 
 




"Compulsory evacuation and arson in Veidnedklubben and the killing of 
Frau Wilhelmine Soerensen. 
 
"Interrogated on 2 July 1946 in Veidnedklubben: The witnessWilhelmine 
Soerensen. He is familiar with the incident and understandshis 
responsibility as a witness. He is ready to make a statement anddeclares: 
 
"On 16 December 1944 the witness was on the trip by motorboat toIfjord. 
At that time most of the residences in Veidnes had been burnedby the 
Germans, but the entire population had fled to the mountains andwas 
living in adobe huts. No Germans were left in any camps inLakesfjord, 
which made the population feel secure from the Germans.Arriving [v typed 
over i] at Ifjord the witness and the other people inthe motorboat 
suddenly became aware of a warship lying in the Trollbuktnear the shore. 
Dawn had just broken and the moment the people in themotorboat saw the 
warship, automatic weapons from there shot in frontand behind the 
motorboat so that there was no possibility forflight. 
 
"When the Commander of the warship hear[sic]d that the families of 
thepeople had remained in Veidnes, the destroyer went to Veidnes. 
 
"There the German lieutenant with 14 soldiers went ashore with aNorwegian 
(Martin Mikelsen) who had orders to show the way to thefamilies. 
 
"The witness and the other people on the motorboat remained aboardand 
were locked into the boxes where the ropes are kept. There theyremained 
locked up until 2100 hours when the Captain arrived and issuedan order to 
some others to go ashore. 
 
"The witness and two other people remained aboard in the box wherethe 
ropes are kept all night. The next day at 12:00 o'clock the witnesswas 
permitted to come out of the box and to move around the deck freely. 
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About half an hour later the Norwegian Julius Mattisen came aboard. The 
witness inquired of him concerning the witness'wife and for the first 
time he heard that she had been shot to death bythe Germans up in the 
mountains the afternoon or evening before. Thewitness then tried to talk 
to the Captain.  However, thelatter had gone ashore. At 2:00 o'clock the 
same afternoon theCommander came aboard and the witness could talk to 
him. The Captainrelated that the wife of the wi[sic]tness had been killed 
unintentionally.Civilians some of them armed had fled at the arrival of 
the Germans.The Kommando [sic] had opened fire from the ship and thus the 
wife ofthe witness had been hit. The Captain further related that the 
wife ofthe witness had been buried in a lake in the country. The witness 
thenwanted to go in order to get the body he was not permitted to do so 
andnow the Captain said she had been buried in the ocean." 
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The name of the wife of the witness was Wilhelmine, nee Eriksen. Her body 
has not been found. 
 
. . . . . . . . . . 
 
After the Germans had burned down all the remaining houses inVeidnes the 
destro[o typed over y]y[y typed over o]er left for Hommingsvaag in the 
evening of 17December. 
 
. . . . . . . . . . 
 
Adult males above 50 years of age were sent as prisoners to theprison 
camp of Kroekeberg. Later they were interrogated by uniformedGermans. 
Having been detained from 11 to 12 days, all prisoners fromVeidnes were 
released from the camp together with some otherprisoners. 
 
Read to and agreed to: signed Egil Soerensen. 
 
. . . . . . . . . . 
 
This particular document, Your Honor, I have just read will bemarked 
Prosecution Exhibit 512. I forgot to mention that to theTribunal. 
 
Then next, Your Honor, turn to page 61, if you please, Norway XI. Itwas 
marked for identification 520-A, and is being offered asProsecution 
Exhibit 520, It is on page 61 and page 56 of the Germandefense counsel 
document book. On pages 56 and 57 of the German defensecounsel document 
book. 
 
This, your Honor, is a medical report by Dr. Karl Evang of theNorwegian 
Ministry of Social welfare, and was requested by Lt. ColonelIvar 
Follestad, Norwegian Attorney General's Office. Itdescribes the 
destruction of Norwegian Medical Installations duringretreat. There is 
also, attached to this particular instrument, a copyof a broadcast of 
BBC. This particular document I am referring to nowwe are not pressing 
for evidence at all. In other words, we aremerely offering the medical 
report of Dr,[sic] Karl Evang. This is a letterdated June I8, 1947 
addressed to Col. Follestad, and it states: &mdash; 
 
DR. FRITSCH: I am sorry, I just want to see whether I have this letter. 
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DR. RAPP: Your Honor, defense counsel was objecting to the fact thatI was 
reading that part of the letter which dealt with a BBC broadcast,and I 
have just mentioned, the fact we are not offering this, but thelast part 
of this particular letter, Your Honor, ties up the followingpage of the 
document. So in order not to create any further confusion Iwill read now 
only the  last paragraph of this letter, I havealready identified the 
date of the letter and to whom it isaddressed. 
 
. . . . .The details I have been able to gather are based thereforeon 
accounts from individuals or from individual officials. Thematerial is of 
very little use for statistical purposes, I can however,give the 
following information on the medical institutions that weredestroyed by 
the Germans in North Troms and Finnmark. 
 
. . . . . . . . . . 
 
Then if Your Honor will turn to page 62, page 58 of the GermanDefense 
Counsel Book, the information is furnished as follows: 
 
. . . . .North Troms: 
 
Skjervoey nursing home, destroyed during the evacuation &ndash; 12 beds. 
 
Malselv tuberculosis home. Used by the German air&ndash;force and 
afterwards destroyed &ndash; 14 beds. 
 
Lyngen tuberculosis home. Badly damaged during the evacuation &ndash; 18 
beds. Finnmark: 
 
The following institutions were razed to the ground: Hospital at Kirkenes 
23 beds, nursing home 4 beds. 
 
. . . . . . . . . . 
 
I hope your Honor will permit me to dispense with some of the Norwegian 
names, I am just trying to identify the lines some way. 
 
. . . . . Vadsoe 45 beds, and another hospital at Vadsoe 30 beds, Vadoe 
hospital 54 beds, and another at Vadoe 13 beds. 
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.....Nursing home, Tana.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 
beds 
 
Gamv [v typed over w] ik Red Cross nursing home . . . . . . . . . . . 7 " 
 
Mehamn nursing home . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 " 
 
Red Cross hospital, Kjoellefjord . . . . . . . . 8 " 
 
"   "   "    Berlevag . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 " 
 
Kjelvik Tuberculosis home. Hon, vag . . . . . 38 " 
 
Red Cross Hospital . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 " 
 
Hammerfest hospital, Hammerfest . . . . . . . . . 94 " 
 
St. Vincent Hospital, Hammerfest . . . . . . . . . 20 " 
 
Hammerfest Mental Home . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100 " 
 
Home, Alta.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 
" 
 
Karasjok tuverculosis[sic] home . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 " 
 
Another one . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 " 
 
Tuberculosis home with annex for children 83 " 
 
. . . . . . . . . . 
 
And at the end, 
 
With regard to the medical institutions in Finnmark, these were 
alltotally destroyed when the Germans withdrew with one exception 
&ndash;Viz. &ndash; a small tuberculosis home in Nesseby, 
Varangerfjorden. Withthe exception of the Vadsoe, so and so in hospital 
in Vadsoe, there wastotal destruction of all hospitals. 
 
There are a number of examples that the evacuation was carried outwith 
great brutality and several tragedies were enacted. These werepartly due 
to sick and old being taken from their beds and with aminimum amount of 
clothing, being forced to board small vessels whichwere used during the 
evacuation. Several desperate situations alsooccurred amongst those who 
fled from the evacuation and hid in themountains. Many of these had no 
opportunity to take sufficient clothingwith them. Some were expectant 
mothers and there were even cases ofbirths 
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taking place in Finnmarksvidda under the lost primitiveconditions in 
bitter cold, without clothing and with very littlefood. 
 
This seems to be the only place in which a complete scorched earthpolicy 
was carried out under arctic conditions and in winter time. 
 
(Signature) Karl Evang. 
 
The next document, Your Honor, is page 71, page 68 of the German Document 
Book. It has been marked for identification as Exhibit521-A, and it is 
being offered now and submitted as Prosecution Exhibit521. This is a 
letter from the statistical Office of Finnmark,addressed to the Supreme 
Court Attorney Ivar Follstad, VictoriaTerrasse 7, in Oslo, dated February 
25, 1947 and his subject: "Wardamages in the Finnmark and North Troms. It 
states as follows: 
 
. . . . . In answer to your letter of 18 inst. Town Council begs to state 
as follows: 
 
In connection with the claims of reparation by Norway on Germany theTown 
Council has collected information on the war damages. Thoseinformations 
are, however, not complete concerning the distributionof the damages on 
the different districts, but on the basis of thematerial produced, the 
Town Council has been able to put up thefollowing survey on the damages 
especially as regard Finmark andNorth-Trome. The informations are partly 
based on approximatecalculations and do pretend to be complete. 
 
. . . . . . . . . . 
 
DR. FRITSCH: I object to the submission of this documentas evidence. This 
is information which cannot be checked atall. It is imp-ossible for the 
defense to bring the Town Council fromOslo here and crossexamine them. 
The Statements are notidentified. It is merely an indictment, and 
therefore I would like thatthe objection be sustained 
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JUDGE CARTER: It will be admitted for whatever the Tribunal may find it 
to be worth. 
 
. . . . . Regarding the most important items special information onthe 
damages during the evacuation in the winter 1944/45 has not beenobtained. 
Most of the damages are included in the war damage insurancefor buildings 
and movables amounting to about 270 million Norway Krons,for all the 
years of war. By contacting the War Damage Insurance youwill probably get 
special informations about the damages due to theevacuation. The 
informations on the damages on public harbour works as well as on the 
fishing fleet are complete. The Town Councilhas no special information 
about the part falling within the time ofevacuation. 
 
Roads and bridges. 
 
The road director has estimated the German destructions of roads 
andbridges in the Finmark [sic] during the evacuation in the autumn 
1944to approximately altogether 24.7 million Norw. Kr. of this about 
11million Norw. Kr. for roads and 13.7 "   "  " bridges. 
 
Other war damages on roads and bridges in the Finnmark have not been 
taken up especially.  Telegraph and telephone. 
 
The telegraph director has estimated the damage on stations(inclusive 
radio stations) and on telegraph and telephone wires duringthe German 
evacuation of the Finnmark and North Troms in the Autumn1944 to about 
15.6 million Norw. Kr. 
 
. . . . . . . 
 
JUDGE CARTER: It appears the time for adjournment has arrived. We will 
adjourn until 9:30 tomorrow morning. 
 
(Thereupon at 4:30 p.m. an adjournment was taken) 
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Official Transcript of the American Military Tribunal in the matterof the 
United States of America against Wilhelm List, et al,defendants, sitting 
at Nurnberg [sic], Germany, on 27 August 19470930-1630, Justice 
Wennerstrum, presiding. 
 
THE MARSHAL: Persons in the court room will please find their seats. 
 
The Honorable, the Judges of Military Tribunal V. Military TribunalV is 
now in session. God save the United States of America and thishonorable 
Tribunal. There will be order in the court. 
 
THE PRESIDENT: The Marshal will ascertain if all defendants are in the 
court room. 
 
THE MARSHAL: May it please your Honor all defendants are present inthe 
court room except Weichs who is absent due to high blood pressure. 
 
THE PRESIDENT: If a certificate has been issued by the prisondoctor you 
may hand it to the Secretary&ndash;General. You may proceed Mr.Rapp. 
 
MR. RAPP: Your Honors please turn to Document Book XXIII, page73, page 69 
of the German Document Book. We have reached the part ofthis page,  
"Telegraph and Telephones" in the middle of the pageand we now come to: 
"Harbors and Harbor works. 
 
The port director has estimated the war damages on official bridgesin the 
FINNMARK and NORTH&ndash;TROMS DISTRICTS during the German evacuationin 
the autumn 1944 to approximately . . . .2.2. million Norw. kr. 
 
"In addition to this there are considerable damages on privatebridges and 
quais. The amounts for these damages are included in thefigures mentioned 
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"The War Damage Insurance from buildings has estimated the wardamages on 
houses and buildings in agriculture in the FINMARK and NORTHTROMS 
districts to about . . . . 12 mill. kr. 
 
"The War Damage Insurance for movables has estimated the war damageson 
machines and farming outfits domestic animals, crop and furniture toabout 
. . . . . . . .6 million kr." That is on page 74, your Honor. 
 
"These figures are purely agriculture risks. All damages on the property 
belonging to the fishing population have been enteredunder civil risk 
below. 
 
"The damages to the forests of the Finnmark and the 
North&ndash;Tromsdistricts during the war, inclusive the devastation made 
by the Germansduring the evacuation in the autumn 1944 and inclusive 
future losses due to exploitation of the forests, have been estimatedby 




The war damages on industrial buildings in the FINNMARK and 
 
NORTH&ndash;TROMS districts have been estimated by the War Damage 
 
Insurance to about . . . . . .38 mill. kr. 
 
"The War damages on industrial movables in the FINMARK 
ANDNORTH&ndash;TROMS districts have been estimated by the War Damage 
Insurancefor movables to about . . . . . . . .5 mill. k4 [sic]. 
 
Houses and buildings, Movables, Civil Risks. 
 
"The War Damage Insurance for buildings has estimated the war damages on 
buildingsin the FINNMARK AND NORTH&ndash;TROMS (exclusive buildings has 
estimated theagriculture and industry and those belonging to the state) 
to about 114mill. kr. 
 
The War Damage Insurance for movables has estimated the war damages on 
general movables in the FINNMARK and NORTH-TROMS districts (farming and 
industrial movables excluded) 
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"The War Damage Insurance for stocks estimated in September 1945 
theevacuation damages in the FINNMARK in the autumn 1944 to about . . 
..18.4 mill kr. 
 
The actual amounts are now considered 2&ndash;3 million Norw. kr. 
toohigh, but if all war damages on stock in the FINNMARK for April 
1940&ndash;May 1945 are taken into consideration, the amount can be 
accounted for.The war damages outside the evacuation damages only 
amounted to about2&ndash;3 mill kr. 
 
Goods on board ships. 
 
"The State Goods War Insurance estimates the war damaged on goodsonboard 
ships in the FINNMARK during the evacuation in the autumn 1944to about . 
. . . . . .1.2 mill. kr. 
 
"Various war damages covered by private insurance companies are notto be 
obtained in detail on FINNMARK. The amount of these damages is,however, 
not estimated to be very high, considering the total amount ofdamages 
claimed by all insurance companies together for reparation wardamages to 
be about 16 million Norw. kr. for the whole of the countryand for all the 
years of war. 
 
Ships, freighters, larger and smaller fishing boats as well as all sorts 
of small vessels. 
 
"All smaller vessels at a value under 250 kr. were included in theWar 
Damage Insurance as movables and amounts for wreckages and wardamages on 
such boats in the FINNMARK ARE INCLUDED IN the amount of 94million kr. 
under the item for movables above. 
 
"By the State War Damage Insurance the amount of 1.9 million Norw.kr. was 
mentioned as the sum that this institution has paid especiallyfor war 
wrecked boats, but also for partial war damages 
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during the war on boats having their basis in the FINNMARK and 
NORTH&ndash;TROMS districts. 
 
"The re-insurance institute for the fishing fleet, BERGEN statesthat the 
amount of reparation costs paid by it for totally 
war&ndash;wreckedfishing boats , etc. and for partial war damages on such 
boatshaving their basis in the FINNMARK and NORTH&ndash;TROMS districts 
for allthe years of war amounted to a total of approximately 2 million 
Norw.Kr. Perhaps the re&ndash;insurance institution is now able to give 
moreexact information and especially also for the damages during 
theevacuation. 
 
"In addition to the two amounts mentioned here of about 1.9 millionNorw. 
kr. and about 2 million Norw. kr. are amounts paid by the 
privateinsurance companies for their insurance responsibility on war 
damageson fishingboats [sic] and other boats. As mentioned above no 
information hasbeen obtained about this last amount. 
 
"When these above mentioned amounts are added  [sic], the lump sum 
isabout  360 million Norw. kr. for the war damages mentionedunder the 
individual items. It is to be mentioned that thesedamages cover direct 
war or direct destruction through war actions.Damages brought about in 
connection with requisitions of houses andgrounds as well materials with 
special reference to the exceptionalwear and tear following the German 
use for houses and buildings,roads and bridges etc. and material 
requisitioned is not included inthis amount. 
 
"The amounts mentioned in most of the above are based on theinformation 
presented to the Town Council during the war andimmediately after this 
and they are calculated according to theprices before 9 April , 1940, 
 
At present further additional amounts might have arisen by which the 
final figures would have been still higher. 
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"As a comparison it can be mentioned, that the informations receivedby 
the Town, Council up till November 1945 represent the war damagesfor the 
whole country including the total losses of ships preliminarilycalculated 
to more than 3 billion Norwegian kroner. 
 
Rubber Stamp: OSLO TOWN COURT 
 
Signature: A.  Skien." 
 
For your Honors' information and merely as a gratuitous comment, the 
Kroner is now about five kroner to the dollar, at present. 
 
On Page 80, this particular document dontinues and there we have aletter 
dated 3 July 1947, signature: A.  Roll-Mathiessen, Presented InOslo Town 
Court. 3 July 1947: 
 




OSLO, 26 June 1947 
 
NORWAY 
Dronningens Gate 16 
 








Your Ref . AS/NH 
 
File No. 849/47 
 






Criminal case against General RENDULIC &mdash; concerning the ravages in 
the FINNMARK 1944/45. 
 
We are in receipt of your query of 20 ult, regarding informationon the 
value of the real estate in the FINNMARK and NORTH&ndash;TROMS before9 
April 1940. For this reason, the town council has had a conferencewith 
the authorities who supplied the information 
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about the ravages before, and who have made a number of calculationsof 
the total values before April 1940 for the different groups ofproperty in 
the FINMARK and NORTH&ndash;TROMS. 
 
The calculations are as exact as they possibly could be at the present 
time, and the evaluation of land and ground has been kept apart as you 
mentioned in your letter. 
 
Subsequently the evaluation of property together with the estimationof 
damages have been put up and a percentage of damage within thevarious 
groups. The amount of damages according to 'the letter from thetown 
council of 25 February this year, has in some cases been 
correctedaccording to more recent and complete informations. 
 
Buildings, furniture [r typed over m] and movables etc. 
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As mentioned in letter of 25 February most of the damages in the 
 
in the FINMARK [sic] and NORTH&ndash;TROMS districts are under the 
wardamage insurance for buildings and movables amounting to about 
270million Norw. cr[sic]. This preliminary figure has now been 
correctedby the company to about 290 million Norw.er[sic]. The total 
capitalon buildings &mdash; furniture and movables in these provinces in 
April 1940can be stated to approximately 350 million Norw. c[c tyeped 
over e]r. Thisamount comprises all houses, buildings, fire insured and 
not fireinsured (inclusive municipal buildings but excluding the 
buildings ofthe State, which have been entered under various items 
below.Furthermore, it comprises all furniture and movables, 
machines(immovable and movable),  tools and implements, crops 
andprofessional movables for agriculture (inclusive domesticanimals), 
private bridges and quais, all small boats with a valuebelow 250 Norw. 
cr. [sic] etc. The percentage of damage for the groupmakes about 83. 
 
Roads and bridges 
 
The total value on April 1940 of all roads and bridges which arepart of 
the constructions of the road service as well asworkshops, tools and 
stocks has been calculated by the Road Board toabout 80 million Norw. cr. 
[sic] The damages of roads and bridgesduring the evacuattion [sic] in the 
autumn 1944 which was formerlycalculated to about 24.7 million Norw. cr. 
[sic] has now beensupplemented by 5-10 million Norw. cr. [sic] for 
workshops,outfits and stocks (which had been extended considerably 
duringthe war and which was almost completely damaged) to a totalamount 
of about 33 million Norw.cr. [sic] or approximately 40% of thetotal 
value. For the bridges damage was complete. 
 
Telegraph and telephone. 
 
The damage on stations (inclusive radio stations and air bases) 
andtelegraph and telephone wires during the evacuation was 
formerlyestimated to about 15.6 million Norw.cr. [sic] This preliminary 
amounthas been corrected to about 20 million Norw. cr. [sic] The damage 
isreckoned to be total. 
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Harbours and Harbour works. 
 
The part director has formerly estimated the war damage on 
publicbuildings (bridges belonging to the State, the port service and 
thelocal port services) in the FINMARK [sic] and NORTH&ndash;TROMS 
duringthe evacuation to approximately 2.2 millionen [sic] Norw. cr. 
[sic]as a supplement was made for buildings and storehouses etc. 
belongingto the port service, which was not included before. The damage 
isconsidered to be total. 
 
Ships, freighters smaller and larger fishing boats. 
 
The town counsil [sic] has calculated the boat property in theFINMARK 
[sic] and NORTH&ndash;TROMS in Aril 1940 to approximately 16.5million 
Norw. cr. [sic] (about 15 million Norw. cr. [sic] for somelarger boats 
originating from HAMMERFEST, VARDO and VADSO.) [sic] 
 
The total amount of damage for warwrecked and wardamaged fishingboats in 
the FINMARK [sic] and NORTH-TROMS during the whole of the warhas been 
estimated by the war insurance company for the fishing fleetto 2.9 
million Norw. cr. [sic] If the value of the larger boats whichpractically 
all have been wrecked, is added to this amount the totaldamage for this 
group is approximately 4.5 million Norw. cr.[sic] or 27.5 of the total 
amount of 16.5 million Norw. cr. [sic] Inthe letter of the town council 
dated 25 February of this year, thedamages on this item are provisionally 
calculated to about 4 millionNorw. cr. [sic] 
 
Stores of goods and goods on board ships. 
 
The town council has formerly given the damages under those items to 
about 19.5 million Norw. cr. [sic] The damage was total. 
 
Various war damages covered by private insurance companies. 
 
These are not able&ndash;as mentioned before&ndash;to give any 
informationfor the FINMARK [sic] and NORTH&ndash;TROMS provinces alone. 





The damages on the forests of the FINMARK [sic] and 
NORTH&ndash;TROMSduring the war, including the devastation made by the 
Germans duringthe evacuation in the autumn 1944 and inclusive future 
losses due to the 
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exploiting of the forests, was formerly given by the town council 
asapproximately 25 million Norw. cr. [sic] The assets of the forests 
inApril 1940 are calculated to about 40 million Norw. cr. [sic] 
whichresults in a percentage of damage of about 60%. The reason for 
thepercentage of damages being so high is evidently, as mentioned 
before,the fact that in the estimate of the damages the future losses 
onaccount of exploitation of the forests is included. 
 
In addition to the amounts mentioned above concerning the buildings of 
the Stateas well as material etc. there are some amounts relating to the 
powerstaotions [sic] of the State, the State's schools, personages, 
postoffices etc. inclusive furniture, material and outfits 
oftransportation. The evaluation of those buildings etc. on April 1940 
iscalculated to about 5 million Norw. kr. and the damages during the 
warand the evacuation to approximately 4.5 million Norw. kr. 
 
If all the amounts referring to the individual items above, are added 
together,the total evaluation of the property of the FINMARK [sic] 
andNORTH&ndash;TROMS on April 1940 is about 530 million Norw. 
kr.(exclusively the value of land and ground) and a total damage 
ofapproximately 400 million Norw. kr. i.e. an average percentage of 
damages of about 75% 
 
signature: ARNE SKAUG 
 
signature: A.  Skoien 
 
Rubber stamp: Oslo Town Court. 
 
Dronningens Gate 16, 
 





Our reference HM/SF DOCUMENT 4 
 




Criminal case against the General Rendulic &ndash; concerning the ravages 
in the FINNMARK and NORTH&ndash;TROMS 1944/45. 
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According to letter from the Norw. Govt. statistical office of 25February 
and 26 June this year, some of the items of war damages forthe FINNMARK 
and NORTH&ndash;TROMS districts are covering all damages duringthe war, 
and consequently also the damages before the evacuation 1944/45. 
 
To&ndash;day the Town Council has, however, obtained the 
followingadditional information about the part of damages that is to 
beattributed to the time before the evacuation and during the evacuation 
 
Building, furniture and movables, etc. 
 
In the letter by the Town Council of 26 June, the damages have beenput 
down with a total amount of about 290 million Norwegian kr. Of thisamount 
approximatively 50 million Norw. kr. cover the time beforethe evacuation 
and 240 million Norw. kr. approximately the evacuationperiod. The 
percentage for damages on buildings, furniture andmovables, etc. during 
the evacuation then amounts to 70 ships, freighters, larger and smaller 
fishing boats. 
 
The Town Council has no information at present about the part of 
theamount of damage of 4.5 million Norw. kr. falling within the time 
ofwar before the evacuation. Still the damages before the evacuation were 




The main part of the damages on the forests in the FINNMARK 
andNORTH&ndash;TROMS districts, estimated to approximately 25 million kr. 
fallsinto the time of evacuation. The damages before the time of 
evacuationcan only be estimated to 2&ndash;3 million Norw. Kr. 
Considering that theestimate of damages for the time of evacuation of 
approximately 23.5 million Norw. kr.,  the percentage obtained is about 
56%. 
 
Supplement to the buildings belonging to the State as well as material, 
etc. 
 
The damages included in the amount of 4.5 million Norw. kr. Are only 
concerning the tine of evacuation. 
 
According to the additional information given above the total 
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estimation of the damages for the FINNMARK and NORTH&ndash;TROMS forthe 
time of evacuation is about 400 million Norw. kr. minus about 52.5million 
Norw. kr. 347.5 million Norw. kr. or an average percentage ofabout 63% of 




Signature: A.  SKIEN 
 
If your Honors now please turn to page 17 of the document book, page19 of 
the German document book. This document was offered foridentification 




I would like to call to your Honors attention that we have onlytranslated 
excerpts of this letter from the City Engineer ofHammcrfest, but we have 
furnished defense counsel with a completetranslation of such a letter. 
 
The City Engineer of Hammerfest 
 
The devastation of Hammerfest after the compulsory evacuation of the 





On Sunday 29 October it was proclaimed that "the population ofFinmark 
[sic] was to be compulsorily evacuated immediately". The firstdistrict of 
Hammerfest to be evacuated was Fuglenes&ndash;Storelven at thelatest 
Holiday, 30 October, 1200 hours. 
 
On Monday 30 October I called on the then Island Commandant liar 
orGaedke&ndash;who simultaneously was Evacuation Commissar&ndash;in order 
to find outwhat was to happen to the public utilities i.e., fire 
department,water works, electricity works etc., I was together with 
theAdministrator of telegraphy who wished to receive similar 
informationconcerning telephone and telegraph. We were told that there 
was nofurther use for the fire department. However, the water and 
theelectricity works were to continue until further orders. I 
askedwhether I myself should remain in the city and was told that of 
course 
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I did not have to evacuate. Then I stated the necessary number 
ofemployees I required i.e. three engineers, one guard for the den of 
theelectricity work and preferably three men for the water work. 
However,the families of these people had to be evacuated because women 
andchildren were not permitted to remain. 
 
The fire department was given leave of absence. Some of them hadleft 
already&ndash;they had been evacuated to the country previously withtheir 
families-as had other inhabitants of the city. 
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"After the evacuation of the population was finished on 3November it 
became possible in the course of the following week tocollect, pack up 
and to send away all essential remaining firedepartment and air 
protection material with the help of the persons whohad remained. This 
material was collected from different places. All ofit was went away with 
two freighters which had stayed there withevacuees and loaded diverse 
goods. 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
 
"On 15 November when the General Horwegian [sic] Telegraph servicewas 
supposed to be liquidated or terminated and the machines were to 
bedismantled I telegraphed as a matter of orderly procedure to the 
NorgesBrandkasse (Norwegian Fire Insurance). I told them that the 
firedepartment had ceased to exist on 1 November and that according 
torumors the city was to be destroyed entirely. . . . . . . . . 
 
"The devastation of the city 
 
The figures in parenthesis in the following refer to the enclosedmap of 
Hammerfest 1:4000. This map shows the different areas orbuildings. 
 
"As early as on the 5 and 6 November 3 farms in Fuglenesdalenand all 
smaller buildings in the neighborhood of the city wereburned down and at 
the same time also the houses in Soeroyesund&ndash;thearea along the 
Akkerfjordweg to Sjaaholmen. &ndash;The building containingthe reduction 
valves of the water works seemingly was mistaken foran ordinary dwelling. 
It was burned down so that the valves were partlydestroyed packing wore 
standing open. After the inspection theEvacuation Commissar 
Court V Case VII 
27 Aug 47 3-2-M-GW-Maloy 
 
was informed that the mains of the water works would freeze if a heavy 
frost should occur which would put the works out of commission. . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
 
"(2) On 22 November the first part of the city, the western part (Hauen) 
&ndash;about 50 plots&ndash;were burned down. One or two buildings were 
blasted in order to prevent the fire from spreading to other 
buildings.  At the corner of the cemetery in the street toward the 
Krutthusstrasse a few small bombs and some burning wood had been 
dropped.  German soldiers were successful in removing all this with the 
exception of one bomb which exploded and blasted a piece of tho cemetery 
wall,&ndash;The burning down had started in the morning.  About 9:00 
o'clock I arrived at a place whore the German soldiers brought out hose 
from a fire station to extinguish the fires.  They wanted to prevent the 
fire from spreading across the street toward the elementary school. 
However, the keys for the hydrants, the connection for the hose etcetera 
were missing,  I then had to help to organize the extinguishing and were 
now able to keep the fire from spreading. -  
 
"During the following days all foundations of the burned down places were 
blasted.  There were still 10 buildings standing unharmed, west across 
the Akkerfjerdweg. They remained until the last. . . . . . . . . . 
 
"(5) On 16 December the settlement on Hammeren near 
Fuglenesweg&ndash;(Mella) a total of 5 buildings was burned down.  One 
house (Lockkos) down the road remained whole. 
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"(6) On the 24 December (Christmas Eve) the houses near the old shooting 
area near Stervannet, a single house in Breillia (Roy Pedersens) and a 
few little barracks, the building on Einan and the Ilslageret were burned 
down (for nothing). 
 
"(6a) On 27 December the remaining houses in Breilia and the nursery, the 
Villa Nissens and the rest of the barracks around there were burned 
down.  On the same day probably also the buildings below the power plant 
were burned down. On 28 December the large Naval barracks on Skansen 
Fuglenes were burned. 
 
"On one of the first days of 1945 the buildings west of Stottabakken on 
Fuglenes (5&ndash;6 houses) were burned down. 
 
"(7) On 12 January 1945 the buildings east of Storelven were burned down 
i.e. the entire Mella and Mellaplataa including the buildings on the spur 
of Storelven from Storvannot.  However, not the factory of Hauan with its 
storage plant where cement was kept. 
 
"(8) On 13 January 1945 all of Fuglenes, so to speak was burned down 
excepting the steam operated factory of Feddersen &amp; Nissen and the 
landing stages there and the two western buildings up above including 
three houses in Fuglenesbugten.  Still remaining are the buildings of the 
coal depot of Robertson and the hospitals with the apartments for the 
physicians and janitors.  
 
"(9) . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
 
"(10) The following were burned on 20 January: the remaining parts of 
eastern city district between Storelven and Material&ndash; and Stenkuls 
Kleminningen building on Battor iebakken up to and including the corner 
building 
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number 474 with the three houses in the back below the new sub-stations. 
 
"(11) On the following days the main building of Robertson and the 
packing houses in Fuglenes and the landing stages and buildings were 
demolished.  These belonged to the Finmark Canning Factory. 
 
 "(12) After the houses on the southwest side of Storvannet had been 
evacuated (the Prohibited area) which had been requisitioned by the Naval 
Commandant they wore all burned down and a newly erected bunker building 
with tremendous iron concrete walls and iron concrete roof (broadcasting 
station etcetera) was blasted. 
 
"In connection with the burning down of the city all poles of the 
electrical power lines were sawed down, the insulators were broken and 
the wires were rolled up and sent away. Transformers and the equipment of 
the transformer stations also were dismantled and sent away with German 
ships.  As early as 19 November 1944 the dismantling of unitII of the 
power station was started after the old direct&ndash;currency generator 
for 1890 had been taken away. Generator III with the switch table and 
switches and the regulator of the turbine later was sent away by a German 
ship. Further dismantling was unsuccessful. 
 
"On 4 December the destruction of the high voltage power line 
Porsa&ndash;Hammerfest was started.  They left the poles a good meter 
above the surface. The insulators were broken and the copper wires were 
cut, tolled up and taken away.  Usually it was cut off at each pole so 
that the wire has only old metal value. I do not know what happened to 
the transformer poles later. 
 
"On 6 February 1945 I received orders to leave the city, 
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together with all Norwegians and the German units and the Russian 
prisoners.  Only a small detachment of engineers (blasting detachment), 
consisting of about 20 men and one lieutenant, and the evacuation 
authorities and a Norwegian tugboat with two Norwegian engineers on board 
remained. I received information from them concerning the fate of the 
rest of the city which was confirmed by the Germans mentioned above whom 
I met in Tromsee. 
 
"(13) When we were in Haaja, fire was discovered in the district of the 
elementary school.  Its reflection was visible to the neighborhoof of 
LoppA.  All the remaining buildings in the center district of the city 
from Krutthusgaten to the steamer landing stage were burning all night, 
also all churches. A fresh southern wind prevailed. The German port 
captain related that ‘unfortunately' fire had broken out in the Soldiers 
Home on Sadel Street (No. 353, together with No. 49, where the blasting 
detachment lived).  It had been hoped that the church would remain but 
the tower started to burn and the church also was lost.  On the following 
days the installation of the bunker depot was burned down and the crane 
tracks were blasted as well as the salt silo. But the demolitions didnot 
work out as successfully as they were planned.  The hospitals with the 
two apartments also were blasted and everything was levelled to the 
ground.  The other buildings of Fuglenes and in the western part of the 
city and by the way some other houses - all of wood - were burned 
down.  The refrigeration plant and the administrative building of FFR - 
both of them of iron concrete - were blasted. 
 
"The steamboat landing stage also was blasted but later the tug had great 
difficulty to break up the supporting pillars and here the blasting did 
not seem to have the intended effect either. 
 
"The bridges across Storelven and Svartelven were blasted.  The crews 
were prohibited from going ashore because mines had been laid. I wish to 
add in this connection that two German members of the Organization Todt 
(engineer Beer and one soldier) lost their lives on 24 January in one of 
the many shelters of the civilian air raid protection 
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(near Svartelven) where tread mines had been laid also.  It seems that in 
the main street as well as in all side streets which were open for 
automobile traffic such mines were laid until the end. 
 
"The power station with the remaining machines and transformers was 
blasted on 5 February at 10:00 o'clock after the plant had stopped 
functioning at 9:00 o'clock.  It was alleged that afterwards the dam was 
blasted and the pipe lines probably were blasted in some spots. All 
transformer stations were blasted after the electrical apparatus and the 
transformers had been dismantled and removed.  The high voltage cables in 
the stations were cut above the floor but they are believed to have 
remained undamaged otherwise excepting near two blasted bridges. 
 
"It is assumed that of the water work units the intermediate dam ....and 
the installations of the reduction valves had been blasted - in any case 
bombs had been brought there. Also a nine inch main line in the tubular 
bridge across Storelven where depth bombs had been laid. It seems that 
the line to Fuglenes was destroyed by the blasting of the bridge across 
Svartelv and/or of the road near this bridge.  The jetty on the city side 
and the jetties on Fuglenes are undamaged. 
 
"As stated above, after each burning the foundations, the smoke stacks, 
etc. were systematically blasted and levelled to the ground. It seems 
that the part of the city which was burned down after the sixth 
represents an exception.  There the blasting was started.  It stopped 
when the Germans suddenly left the city on 10 February 1945. Some smoke 
stacks, etc. were left standing near the Oscars-Plass, elementary 
school.  It is possible that the Zentralkommandoplatz (iron concrete on 
the first floor) also has been forgotten.  It was covered by snow on 6 
Feburary.  On 10 February 1945 only the chapel in the cemetary remained 
standing. 
 
"Temporarily Oslo, 20 April 45, signed Kummeneje (City Engineer)." 
 
The next page attached to it was: 
 
"To the Population. 
 
"It has been decreed that the compulsory evacuation of the popula- 
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tion of Finmark will be carried out immediately. 
 
"In Hammerfast this compulsory evacuation is to be carried out in the 
following manner. 
 
"The section Fuglenes-Storelven is to be evacuated by 12 noon Monday 30 
October. People who do not go without delay to the Evacuation Office in 
the City Hall, 2nd floor  (tax office) in order to be assigned 
transportation will be picked up by the" — there is an asterisk — "Police 
and the Wehrmacht. 
 
"The Evacuation Authorities. 
 
"*) Changed later to ‘den vepnede makt' (Armed Forces, Wehrmacht)" 
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JUDGE BURKE: Mr. Rapp, without indicating that the document you have just 
read will have any ovidentiary value or will be accepted as having any 
probative value, I am wondering about the ambiguity in the translation of 
the second paragraph you have just read. 
 
MR. RAPP: Your Honor is referring to "In Hammerfest this compulsory 
evacuation is to be carried but in the following manner." 
 
JUDGE BURKE:  Yes.  The apparent difference in being able to translate 
the language as to whether they were evacuated by the police or 
Wehrmacht, or by the Armed Forces, Wehrmacht. 
 
MR. RAPP:  Your Honor, I hove been advised that the insert was put in 
there for the benefit of the Norwegian population to whom this particular 
proclamation was addressed, and it in both instances means the same.  In 
other words, the word "den vopnodo makt" is the translation into 
Norwegian of the German word "Wehrmacht", and that has been put in 
parenthesis.  I believe that is what you are referring to in the above 
paragraph.  If Your Honors permit me I would like to show you the 
original, how it actually looked and was corrected. 
 
"The time for compulsory evacuation of the next part of the city will be 
published by proclamation. 
 
The Evacuation authorities. 
 
") Changed later to "don vopnode makt" (Armed Forces, Wehrmacht." 
 
If Your Honor will turn now, please, to page 26, page 28 of the German 
Document Book, Norwegian Doc. VI has been marked for identification as 
Exhibit 523-A.  
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We are submitting it now as Prosecution Exhibit 523. 
 
DR. FRITSCH:  Your Honor, I would like to ask the Prosecution who 
Prouthun should be, whether the Prosecution asserts this is a subordinate 
of the defendant Rendulic? 
 
MR. RAPP: Your Honor, the individual Preuthun was an evacuation 
commissionor appointeed by the then Norwegian Minister President 
Quisling.  The sole purpose of this document is to show that these facts 
as contained in the document and reported within their own then Quisling, 
Government did happen during the evacuation. Minister .-hist is minister 
of the Government at that time, and Prouthun was evacuation commissioner 
of some liasson position to the 20th Mountain Army. 
 
DR. FRITSCH:  I protest against the introduction of this document as 
evidence, because I don't think that this evidence is relevant.  It has 
nothing to do with the defendant Rendulic. 
 
MR. RAPP:  Your Honor, this is an allegation on the part of defense 
counsel which we cannot concede.  I think it has very much to do with the 
defendant Rendulic, because it shoves what actually happened during the 
evacuation, and it was found in the Quisling files of the Norwegian-
German puppet government at that time, and we feel it has strong 
probative value, because it shows what occurred during the evacuation and 
the date is fixed at the time, so that the defendant Rendulic was in 
charge of the evacuation. 
 
THE PRESIDENT: In the light of our previous rulings it will be admitted, 
however, the Tribunal by that admission is not indicating what, if any, 
probative 
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value it will later give to this document, 
 
MR. RAPP:  It is dated, Hammerfest, 3.11.44, 1655 hours, 
 
To Minister W HIST 
 
For information concerning situation stop SCHONER "Fortuna" 50 tons 
loaded from Losbosby with 250 persons including Old Age Home and 10 
persons confined to bed half frozen to death on dock stop Seventeen hours 
to here stop Transport must be continued in the same manner stop The 
people received warning two hours before, and were ordered not to take 
along food or bedding since according to original German plan the men 




MR. RAPP:  Now, Your Honor, the last document in this Document Book 23, 
you will find on page 33, It is page 36 of the German Document 
Book.  This was marked for identification as Exhibit 518-A, and it is now 
submitted as Prosecution Exhibit 518.  These are the charges of the 
Norwegian War Crimes Commission before the United Nations War Crimes 
Commission in London pertaining to the evacuation of the Province of 
Finmark, Norway. 
 
DR. FRITSCH:  Your Honor, I protest against the introduction of this 
document. This document has already been mentioned, and I reserved my 
protest, because this is, as I have already said, surely an 
indictment.  The probative value, therefore, can only be as great as if 
the prosecutive authorities here made some kind of an assertion.  Any 
kind of probative value cannot be gained from such an indictment. 
 
MR. RAPP:  The defense counsel told us the same 
COURT V CASE VII 
27 Aug 47-4-4-M-AEH-Maloy(Evand) 
 
story yesterday, and I understand, the Tribunal told us at that time it 
will be admitted for what it is worth. 
 
MR. FRITSCH:  Your Honor, a ruling was not made. Yesterday I merely 
protested against the form of this document, and I was told that a 
certification by Col. Follestad would bo submitted, and therefore I 
reserved my further attitude. 
 
MR. RAPP: Your Honor, I believe we mentioned yesterday this report was an 
official Norwegian Government report. 
 
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Rapp, did I understand your statement that this was an 
indictment, it was a part of some proceedings in England? 
 
MR. RAPP: No, Your Honor, I mentioned that this is a report in the nature 
of an indictment, or rather in the nature of charges. That is the 
accepted way of the United War Crimes Commission.  In other words, these 
Government reports can only be accepted by the United Nations in the form 
of those charged. They are not being submitted to the United Nations War 
Crimes Commission merely in presenting the evidence as it appears without 
the charges, and as such it was forwarded to us, and we picked it up as 
an official Government report made up in the form of charges. 
 
THE PRESIDENT:  The Tribunal is of the opinion it has no probative value 
as far as this defendant Rondulic is concerned, and the objection will be 
sustained and it will not bo admitted in evidence. 
 
MR. RAPP: Then Your Honor we would like to have this document remain with 
the identification 518-A; is that acceptable to the Tribunal? 
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THE PRESIDENT:  It   is   allright with us. 
 
MR. RAPP:  Mr. Fenstermacher will continue with Document Book 24. 
 
MR. FENSTERMACHER:  May it please the Tribunal, before beginning with the 
presentation of the documents in Document Book 24.  I would like to hand 
to Dr. Laternser a copy of a memo which I received yesterday from the 
Yugoslav delegation attached to the Office of Chief of Counsel for War 
Crimes.  The memo is addressed to me from Lt. Col. Svonimir Ostric, Chief 
of the Yugoslav Delegation, It is dated Nurnberg, 26 August 1947. 
 
"In connection with your inquity this delegation is informed by the 
Yugoslav National War Crimes Commission in Belgrade, Yugoslavia, as 
follows: 
 
1.  "General Bader, Paul, is registered by the United Nations War Crimes 
Commission in London as a war criminal.  He is not in Yugoslav custody, 
and the Yugoslav National War Crimes Commission does not know his present 
whereabouts 
 
2.  "General Dandkolmann, Paul, was delivered to Yugoslavia by the 
British Occupation Authorities in Germany and is now in Yugoslav custody 
in Belgrade, Yugoslavia.  
 
3.  "General Fohn, Gustav, and General Schmidt Ritzberg are registered by 
the United Nations War Crimes Commission in London, as war 
criminals.  They are not in Yugoslav custody and the Yugoslav National 
War Crimes Commission does not know their present whereabouts. 
 
4.  "Col. Zollmeyer, Joseph is at present in Yugoslav custody, in 
Belgrade Yugoslavia."<p style="text-align: center;">[....] 
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DR. FRITSCH:  [....] I would now like, with the permission of the 
Tribunal, to turn to the problems of Norway.  I have, for purposes of 
identification, fixed a map on the wall here, a map of Norway.  It is 
unfortunate that I cannot submit a better map, but I think that, on the 
whole, we don't need that map, and when we do, it will be sufficient. 
 
Q General, how did your assignment in the Nordic area come about? I 
think, to begin with, you were sent to Northern Finland. How did that 
come about? 
 
A In the Spring of 1944 the Finns had entered into negotiations with the 
Russians, and these negotiations did not lead to any results. In June of 
the year 1944 a Russian offensive had started.  This had taken place on 
the Southern Finnish frontier along Lake Ladoga and the Finnish 
border.  This offensive-had a number of successes in the beginning. The 
moral in Finland had so far been quite a depressed one, and it was to be 
expected that the Finns would enter into new negotiations with the 
Russians.  In this situation General Dietl had an airplane accident. Up 
till then he had been the Commander in Chief of the XXth Mountain in 
Lappland.  General Dietl was a personality who was much 
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esteemed in Finland. I believe all this took place on the 23rd of June. 
During the night, or the 24th of June, I received the order to report on 
the 24th of June at the Fuehrer's Headauarters.  On that day I was given 
the post of the Commander in Chief over the XXth Mountain Army in 
Lappland. 
 
Q What was the relation between Germany and Finland at that time? 
 
A Germany and Finland waged a common war against Russia.  The German 
Mountain Army and the Finnish Army fought side by side on the Finnish 
border.  In spite of this there was no pact or alliance between those two 
countries.  The two countries only acted out of a common interest against 
the common enemy on the basis of military agreements. 
 
Q What was the military situation generally when you arrived in Finland? 
 
A On a front of about 1200 Km East of the Finnish Eastern border there 
was the XXth Mountain Army from the Arctic sea towards the middle of 
Finland, and then came the Finnish Army.  There was no common 
leadership.  The Finnish Army was led by the Marshal of Finland, Freiherr 
von Mannerheim. The front of the Mountain Army was comparatively quiet. A 
war of position of a normal kind was going on here.  The Army itself was 
stationed in two large groups, with two corps in the South of Lappland, 
that is the middle of Finland; and one corps was on the coast of the 
Arctic Sea.  Between those two large groups there were no other 
forces.  The width and depth was 400 Km, and this area was rocky or 
jungle-like. For all practical purposes it was not possible to cross it. 
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Q Was this question of terrain which you just mentioned of any special 
significance and importance concerning the battles and the later events? 
 
A Yes, it was of quite decisive importance.  In the whole area of 
Lappland, which is the Northern part of Finland, and the area of my Army, 
three-quarters of the country was covered with jungles, which could not 
be negotiated.  The area was rocky or swampy.  Towards the North, up to 
the Arctic Sea, there was tundra and entirely rocky areas. This was very 
important considering the fact that the area could not be negotiated 
because there were only very few roads in this area.  In Lappland there 
were, for all practical purposes, only three highways— the so-called 
Arctic Sea highway which ran from North to South through Lappland and 
which was about 600 Km long; and in the South of Lappland there were two 
highways, each of which led to one of the corps stationed there. All 
these highways met in Rovanjemmi, which is in Southern Lappland, a 
locality near the polar circle and from there two roads led to the 
Swedish frontier, to the so-called frontier highway which went along the 
Swedish frontier to Norway to the Lyrgen fjords. 
 
Q How did the political situation in Finland develop after all that? 
 
A At the beginning of August the Finnish Government had resigned, and the 
Finnish President had founded a new government.  The head of this 
government was Mannerheim.  This government soon entered into new 
negotiations with Russia.  The Finns loyally informed us of this Pact. We 
expected that this time the negotiations with the Russians would lead to 
success. We expected that Finland would leave the alliance. 
 
Q What would be the situation then confronting the XXth Mountain Army? 
 
A The situation had necessarily to be extremely difficult if one 
considers the fact that from the Arctic Sea, on the Eastern coast of 
Finland, the front led down to the South and that in the centre of 
 
Finland the German Mountain Army was joined by the Finnish Army, then in 
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the event of Finland's leaving the alliance very suddenly a deep, open, 
uncoverered flank would arise; which was 400 Km deep.  This would be even 
more dangerous because the best roads from Southern Finland, led to 
unprotected road junction of Rovanjemmi, and to the Swedish frontier 
highway.  The loss of Rovanjemmi to strong Russian motorized forces and 
that fact that these forces might reach the Swedish frontier highway, 
which then led straight to Norway, had to lead to a catastrophe, for the 
mountain army. 
 
Q Where any provisions prepared for these events, and, if so, which ones? 
 
A Naturally, everything possible was prepared.  The proper forces were 
withdrawn and put up in preparedness.  We had to block the roads which 
led from Southern Finland.  We had to dynamite all bridges and mine the 
roads to the greatest possible extent. All this we had to do to prevent, 
wherever possible, the enemy breaking into the practically unprotected 
flank of the army.  Of course this could only be prepared in order not to 
provoke the Finns and also possible not to provoke the Russians. But it 
was prepared in the smallest detail. 
 
Q Now, was anything known about the armistice conditions which were to be 
expected on the basis of the negotiations? 
 
A No, unfortunately nothing was known about this. We did know, from the 
negotiations which had taken place earlier, that they had not been 
successful because of two conditions which the Russians had imposed. The 
first condition was that the Russians wanted to occupy Finland; the 
second condition was that the Russians demanded that the Finns were to 
fight against us. We tried to do everything to get clues about the terms 
of the armistice because that would be extremely important to know in 
good time. We were not successful in our attempts, and as late as the 2nd 
of September, the day when the Finnish Army signed the armistice 
conditions, I had a long talk with Mannerheim, in which, of course, we 
did not discuss the armistice which was already a fact. But I thought 
that I was right in the impression that the Finns would, this time, 
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accept the condition to fight against us. 
 
Q And how did the situation actually develop? 
 
A On the 3rd of September the armistice between Finland and Russia was 
concluded. Finland broke off all relations with Germany and demanded that 
the German troops be withdrawn from Finland within 14 days. 
 
Q Was this demand to withdraw the troops within 14 days feasible from a 
military point of view? 
 
A That demand could not be carried out.  The demand obviously had the 
purpose of forcing the Finns to fight against us.  In order to evacuate 
Finland, the troops had to carry out marches of 800 to 1000 Km—marches on 
foot.  This would have meant marching unceasingly for 5 to 6 weeks.  Such 
an enormous effort could not be expected of the troops in such a climate 
and at that time of the year and in such a terrain as I have 
described.  The soldiers would have been able to bear up under this 
effort, but the horses would not have been able to do it. And the 
Mountain Army had very many horses because everything had to be carried 
out on horseback.  In addition we have to consider the fact that there 
were many stores which had to be carried off, and, finally, we have to 
consider that the troops just didn't march off like that. The enemy would 
prevent them from marching off and involve them in combat actions which 
actually did take place. The combat actions which took place, in order to 
get the Mountain Army out of that area, took 5 to 6 weeks, and if one is 
fighting one cannot, after all, march.  It was more than three months 
until finally the last man of the German Army had left Finland, and we 
tried to expedite matters as much as we possibly could, especially in 
consideration of the approaching winter. 
 
Q General, you will remember that a representative of the Prosecution has 
stated here that this period of 14 days was better than no time at all? 
Would you consider that statement correct? 
 
A Anybody who has any insight into the conditions of the roads there, the 
fighting situation, and what the leadership of an Army needed, would 
probably not make such a remark. Those 14 days to us only 
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meant that we could evacuate to Germany the depots and the medical stores 
which we had in Southern Finland.  We could not do anything with these 
stores there because we had so much that we didn't know what to do with 
it all. After all, the Army had been provided for for a period of nine 
months.  These 14 days had no influence at all on the condition of the 
Army; it had even less influence because the Russians did not feel 
themselves bound by this time limit. They attacked already as early as 
the 8th of September. 
 
Q General, will you, very briefly, indicate the next event which occurred 
so that we may gain a picture of the situation? 
 
A As peculiar as this might sound, when we were concerned with a retreat 
we were first of all, busily engaged in building up a new front, a front 
with a depth of 400 Km. We succeeded in doing this in 4 to 5 days. Then, 
we started transporting and evacuating.  On the 7th of September the 
first troop movement was carried out. We succeeded in withdrawing the two 
Southern corps without the Russians knowing it. The Russians followed, 
and from that date on they attached continuously. Crises developed.  The 
troops had already marched off had to return in order to relieve the 
others. But, on the whole, our movement was successful.  The obvious 
purpose of the Russian attacks was to tie us and the Army down, to force 
us to fight, and to destroy us with their superior forces. From the point 
of view of military leadership the Russian actions vere entirely 
correct.  It was the Russian endeavor to use all available means to reach 
the road junction of Rovanjemmi, in order to overtake us from the rear 
and thus reach the highway near the Swedish frontier before we could. The 
battle, to prevent this Russian intention, which sometimes lasted for 
hours, meant to us existence or non-existence of the Army. And it 
succeeded. 
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Q Did the Russian attack now remain restricted to the Southern parts of 
the Army? 
 
A No, 3 weeks later an especially well prepared attack was made against 
the XIXth Corps on the Arctic SeA.   This was a mistake on the part of 
the Russian leadership, which was incomprehensible to me. It was a 
mistake to carry out these two attacks at different times so that it 
became possible for us to counter the Russian superiority by withdrawing 
forces from the Southern group and putting them at the disposal of the 
Corps near the Arctic Sea, and thus support this Corps.  These forces 
succeeded in relieving the XIXth Corps and getting it out of the Russian 
encirclement. 
 
Q General, is this the XIX Army Corps which was east of Kirkenes? 
 
A Yes, this was the XIX Corps which was east of Kirkenes, about 150 Km 
east of Kirkenes. 
 
Q Who commanded it? 
 
A The General of the Mountain Troops, Jodl, who appeared here as a 
witness for the Prosecution. 
 
Q And now when did the first order arrive to evacuate Northern Norway? 
 
A To the best of my recollection that must have taken place towards the 
latter half of September. 
 
Q And how was this order carried out? 
 
A We carried out this order very loosely.  The Army order at that time, 
was to retreat towards approximately the center of Lappland, and there to 
halt. We felt strong enough to defeat all attacks in this position, and 
we made this evacuation a voluntary one by supporting those Northern 
Norwegians who wanted to get away, 
 
Q Did this situation change later on, and, if so, for what reasons? 
 
A This situation changed later for several reasons. Principally on the 
4th of October we received an order saying that we were not to remain in 
Lappland, but instead the Army was to be led back to a position near the 
Lyngen-Fjord in Norway.  That meant to us a movement of about 
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800 to 1000 Km, which would necessarily last far into the Arctic winter. 
Then when in October the attacks against the XIXTh Corps started we were, 
after all, quite surprised that the Russians were in a position to 
emphasize their great numerical superiority, even in that barely 
negotiable terrain. And just around that date, a further order 
arrived.  The four best Mountain Divisions were to be sent to the 
Continent, which meant more than half of the strength of the Army. These 
were events which could not possibly have been anticipated, and they 
naturally influenced our judgment of all problems at hand0 
 
Q General, this order,—to distinguish between concepts which you 
mentioned,—did the action which was to take place on the basis of the 
order of the 4th of September have a code name? 
 
A This movement was called "Nordlicht". 
 
Q You were talking about the influence which became effective through the 
new situation which confronted you? 
 
A This influence was seen particularly in the fact that the Army could 
not deny that the second evacuation order which had come in on the 20th 
of October was fully justified.  Only the OK was in a position to know 
what would be demanded of the Army in the future and which forces would 
be at the disposal of the Army for those purposes. 
 
Q If you knew, a long time before the second evacuation order arrived, 
the Russian strength and counted on the Russians' moving up on you, why 
did you then not demand this order for evacuation and destruction? 
 
A I never waited for orders which were a matter of course, and I never 
asked for orders in matters which I thought I could regulate myself.  I 
knew quite well what I would have to do in accordance with the 
situation.  If I had not received this second evacuation order of the 
28th of October, then I intended to concentrate the population in a 
tolerable area of living space.  The necessary sanitary installations 
were to be left for them, but everything else—the quarters which would 
have become available, the highways which existed, all bridges 
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and harbor installations, and everything else-would have been destroyed. 
The necessity of these measures was never doubted for a single instant by 
anybody. 
 
Q One question in between, General:  Were the Russian troops up to 
standard in a military respect? 
 
A In the extreme North the Russians had to have excellent troops because 
the terrain and the climate were so very difficult, and because the 
German and the Finnish troops which confronted them were some of the best 
units which existed throughout this whole war. The Russians were 
excellent fighters, especially in rocky and forest areas. Their special 
units, such as the "Ski brigades," which were supplement by people from 
Siberia, were excellent and they gave us considerable trouble. 
 
THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn at this time until 9:30 tomorrow morning. 
 
(THE COURT ADJOURNED AT 1630 to RESUME SESSION 
 
at 0930, 31 OCTOBER 1947) 
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Official Transcript of the American Military Tribunal in the 
matter  of  the United States of America against Wilhelm 
List,   et   al,   defendants, sitting at Nurenberg,   Germany,   on 31 
October 1947, 0930.   Judge Burke, presiding. 
 
THE MARSHAL:     Persons in the courtroom will please find their seats. 
 
The Honorable,   the Judges of Military Tribunal V.   Military Tribunal V 
is now in session.   God save the Unites States of America and this 
honorable Tribunal.     There will be order in the courtroom. 
 
THE PRESIDENT:    Mr. Marshal, will you ascertain as to whether or not 
all the defendants are present in the courtroom? 
 
THE MARSHAL: May it please,   Your  honors,   all defendants are present 
in the courtroom except the defendant von Weichs, who is still in t he 
hospital. 
 
THE PRESIDENT:    Judge Burke will preside at  this session. 
 
JUDGE BURKE: You may proceed, Dr. Fritsch. 
 
LOTH R. RENDULIC 
 
DIRECT EXAMINATION (continued BY DR. FRITSCH: 
 
Q    General,   when we   stopped we were discussing the   question of 
Norway.     I had asked you yesterday to give us a picture about the 
strength of  the Russian forces  and you told us  they were  technically 
and numberically superior to your forces;  how did you imagine the 
Russians would follow you up? 
 
A    There were two possibilities as to how this could be done.    First 
of  all  it was possible  they could push on up Highway 50, which led 
from Kirkenes via Tana,   then it was possible that  they would move 
along the highway via Voalov and finally  there was  the possibility to 
follow along the  so called Frontier Highway alon  the Finnish Swedish 
frontier. 
 
Q    General, would you be kind enough to look at the map and show us the 
most important points on it? 
 
A    One possibility would be to push up along Highway 50 
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Q At this opportunity may I point  out  to  the Tribunal that  that  is 
 
the highway which  the Tribunal saw and used when it went to 
Norway,   along Kirkenes   to Hammerfest. 
 
A    Then it was possible to use the ro a to Ivals, which joined 
 
Highway 50. T he third possibility was to push along via Rovanjemmi, 
along the Swedish Frontier Highway to to the Lyngen Fjord.  Those were 
the three possibilities on the land route.  A further possibility was to 
push up also by a sea operation, which we started in the area Murmans, 
which is roughly about here.  (indicating.)  The most suitable places for 
landing were the Fjords of Alta and Vorstwanger in the Southern part of 
Finnmark.  In to this area the roads lead from Finnland, which the Finns 
could have used on the land route. 
 
Q   You are talking about landing operations, General;   did you count on 
the possibility of such landing operations? 
 
A    Landing had a great deal of advantage for the enemy, because to 
march through those grey districts in winter time on through the whole of 
Finnmark is extrememly strenuous, and the Russians could have saved 
themselves this effort if they had carried out a pursuit operation at 
sea, which would have been considerable more simple.  Such an operation 
had to be anticipated.  The OKW also expected landings, even from the 
British, and they thought they would take place somewhere near Narvik, 
and at least half a dozen times we were told the opinion of the OKW 
concerning those landings.  That can be frequently found in the War Diary 
of the Army which arrived here from Washington.   
 
Q   Were the pre-requisites for such a landing good for  the Russians, 
such a landing as you expected would take place? 
 
   A  Yes, we knew that in the Kola Bay there was a great number of 
ships, hundreds of thousands of tons which were part of the convoys which 
came through the Artic Sea to Murmansk about twice a month.  Those were 
convoys of about 50 to 60 freighters, protected by battleships, 
destroyers, aircraft carriers, and other auxiliary vessels.  The Kola Bay 
was reconnoiteved towards the end of September.  We saw a great number of 
ships,      
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battleships, cruisers, aircraft carriers, etc., and these, without doubt, 
were British vessels, because it was wll known the Russians only had one 
battleship in the Artic SeA.  
 
Q  General, if I mention to you the figure 230,000 tons of shipping, 
which I found in one Diary, so said to have been assembled in the Kola 
Bay, would that be sufficient to carry out a large landing operation? 
 
A  Yes, 230,000 tons, can undoubtedly transport six to eight divisions, 
but this number of tons reported here is not the maximum of what the 
Russians would be in a position to use, because twice a month another 
convoy of 100,000 to 200,000 tons of convoy vessels arrived in the Kola 
Bay.  Also we learned towards the end of September or beginning of 
October, (I don't remember the exact date, its in the War diaries).  We 
learned that these convoys, which up until then had been sent by the 
Russians with British support, were led by the British admirally from the 
end of September onwards, and a landing operation would have been 
supported through the fact that the allies had in the extreme North 
undoubted supremacy on Sea and in the air, and those were the best 
prerequistes that they could possibly have for a landing. 
 
Q  Were there other factors as well? 
 
I am mainly thinking about the question of Swedish neutrality; 
neutrality; did you in this respect have to anticipate any difference? 
 
A  Yes, we had to anticipate a violation of Swedish Government, moved one 
infantry division through Sweden to Haparanda, near the Finnish 
Frontier.  It could not be expected that the Swedes would resist Russian 
pressure if the Russians demanded the Swedes to do the same as we had 
demanded from them in 1941.  In that year we had, with the consent of the 
Swedish Government, moved one infantry division through Sweden to 
Haparanda, near the Finnish Frontier.  It could not be expected that the 
Swedes would resist Russian pressure if the Russians demanded the Swedes 
to let them do the same as we had demanded.  Of course, that could only 
been an operation of secondary importance which would have been directed 
against the area near 
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Narvik.  The main operation was to be expected as against Southern 
Finnmark. 
 
Q    In Southern Finnmark is a landing operation dependant on the season? 
 
A   No, it is not dependent on the climate, because under the influence 
of the Gulf stream the fjords do not freeze up.    Also there is not very 
much snow in those districts in winter, but it is quite cold. It was 
known that the Russians as well as to the Finns were extremely 
wellequipped for this winter climate. 
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Q  General, if I may summarize your statements, you said that the Army 
found itself in an extremely difficult position; did the difficult 
position have any effect on the morale of the troops? 
 
A  Yes, it had a considerable effect on the morale of the 
troops.  Everybody was aware of the difficulty of the position.  From 
censorship of soldiers mail we learned that the morale of the soldiers 
sometimes bordered on panic.  We found letters written by soldiers in 
which they said that a "second Stalingrad is in preparation", "the Army 
is doomed", "When we freeze in with the Artic winter we will freeze as 
Russian prisoners". 
 
Q  Did the Russian propaganda and if so to what extent, make use of this 
situation? 
 
A The Russian propaganda made very clever use of this situation.  Above 
all they tried to make the men distrust their leaders.  Very soon after 
Finnland left the allies by radio as well as by leaflets they spread the 
news that the Commander in Chief of the Mountain Army was an Austrian and 
he wanted this Army to fall into the hands of the Russians but this fact 
was discovered and his withdrawal and dismissal was to be expected.  In 
connection with the events of 20 July 1944 and the consequences of this 
event, which had only happened a short time before, this propaganda found 
fertile soil.  There was a very dangerous crisis amongst the soldiers 
especially with regard to confidence in their leaders which could have 
led to a catastrophe if the Army or parts of it came into difficult 
situations.  In order to counteract the effects of the Russian 
propaganda, Hilter, on the 17 September, decorated me with the Golden 
Cross of Honor, and thus the effect of the propaganda was counteracted 
immediately. 
 
Q  General, when were you convinced that the Russians would not push up 
on the land route via Northern Finnmark? 
 
A  I cannot tell you exactly when I became convinced of that fact.  I 
assume it was towards the latter part of November. 
 
Q  Well, what was it you ascertained at that time? 
 
A  It had become known that the Russians had only followed us 
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up past the Krkenes with weak forces.  At first however, we had to assume 
that he wanted to wait and gain time in order to allow things to settle 
down and to consolidate his forces, after many weeks of hard fighting, 
which had cost him many losses, and as one is apt to do as a rule when 
one prepares a new operation.    Q Was it possible to reconnoiter the 
Russian positions so that you could be informed about them? 
 
A During the decisive period of time as of the middle of November, for 
practical purposes it was no longer possible to reconnoiter.  The 
airbases had all been transferred to Norway.  The nearest one was in 
Butevos, which is about 1,000 kilometers distant from the Murmansk 
railway.  Aroundthat time daylight lasted only a very few hours each 
day.  The Artic night had already extended over the majority of the 24 
hours.  Wherefore, in such a great distance for a flight and with the 
very short period of daylight, it was not possible to reconnoiter the 
movements along the Murmask railway thoroughly. 
 
Q General, would you be kind enough to show us on this occasion the 
distances on the map? 
 
A Butevos is here.  (indicating)  I would like to point out at this 
point, Your Honor, that in Butevos we had in themeantime mad an interim 
landing.  That would have been the distance of the approae for 
reconnoitering the movements along the Murmansk railway.   
 
Q Therefore, you would have had to fly over Sweden and Finnland [sic] and 
would have had to fly around this area? 
 
A We would have had to fly over the whole of Finnland. [sic] 
 
Q When was it certain to you that Russia had withdrawn forces from our 
former Lappland Front? 
 
A The first news concerning this fact was received towards the beginning 
of December.  It was a communication from the Army Group North which was 
stationed near the East Prussian Frontier, and it had been confronted by 
a division which up to that time had confronted my front in Lappland.  We 
did not receive any further news concerning any other 
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forces.  My front in Lappland faced about 30 Russian divisions, and the 
Finnish Front faced the same number.  These forces would have in any case 
been far too strong in the very restricted area in Finnmark  The 
withdrawal of forces from the Lappland area could not give us any 
information concerning the real intents of the Russians in Finnmark.  How 
many forces the Russians actually did withdraw never became known to us, 
and I do not know it to this day. 
 
Q And for what reason did you after that period continue the evacuation 
and the destruction? 
 
A The evacuation had, at that date, been actually carried out for all 
practical purposes.  The report concerning the evacuation is dated the 25 
November.  Therefore, it can be assumed that around that date it had been 
concluded.  The destruction which was carried out also in the Southern 
area of Finnmark had to be continued, because moving up on Highway 50 was 
not the only possibility which was open o the Russians.  The even more 
likely operations as of November would have been a landing in Southern 
Finnmark.    
 
Q Why were the destructions which you  carried out not restricted to the 
villages along Highway 50? 
 
A At first sight one might suppose that marching troops would only need 
localities along the march route for quarters, but that is not the 
case.  Even in the districts which are densely populated there were and 
are many villages, like for instance, in the center of Russia.   The 
villages along the march route were never sufficient for the 
accommodating of the marching troops. 
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Instead these troops had to use also those places which were a good 
distance away from the march route, and they had to take into account the 
great strain of the march, when it was necessary to quarter them in 
houses, et cetera, and that would have undoubtedly been necessary at that 
time in Finnmark because of the climate.  If the weather is good those 
extra marches can be saved by spending the night in tents right on the 
road. 
 
DR. FRITSOH: May it pleast [sic] the Tribunal, I would like to submit a 
photostat of this map for information purposes because it is rather 
difficult to see the map. 
 
Q.  General, how about inhabited location along the coast and along the 
fjords? 
 
A.  The inhabited localities along the coast and along the fjords were of 
the same significance.  One has to consider the fact that Highway 50 led 
partly immediately along the coast and partly was very near the 
coast.  It further has to be considered that an army does not only march; 
it also has to live, especially when it is supposedto prepare an 
attack.  Then the army is apt to spread over the whole country.  Not only 
the troops have to accommodated but there are also many installations to 
be taken care of such as work shops, hospitals, depots, installations for 
supply; and for all these installations everything that was there 
concerning houses, et cetera,was necessary to accommodate all these 
operations and that was the military significance of the apparantly [sic] 
far distant inhabited localities.   
 
Q.  Did that also apply for the fishing villages which were way up in 
Norway? 
 
A.  Yes, the same fact applied to them.  As a rule, they could only be 
reached by the cutters or boats.  These were the most important means of 
transportation in the district.  
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We also had out bases in the fjords in those isolated localities and we 
maintained communication with them by boats. 
 
Q.  I would not like to talk about the one specific place and that is 
Hammerfest.  Will you please tell us the significance of Hammerfest? 
 
A.   We worked through all the possibilities which the enemy had 
concerning landings.  On that occasion we again and again were confronted 
with the fact that Hammerfest would be the best point for supply for 
troops which had already landed.  It would be a good starting point and 
woud be a good place for distributionfor the more detailed supplies to 
other landing points in the fjords.  Further, Hammerfesst was situated in 
the vicinity of Highway 50.  In order to get there all one hadto do was 
to cross the narrow Kvaenangen Fjord and then one had an excellent 
road.  The place itself could accommodate a strong regiment or even a 
division if necessary.  This double significance of Hammerfest was a fact 
for an enemy in pursuit.  You must not think that we destroyed wantonly 
or senselessly.  Everything we did was dictated by the needs of the 
enemy.  That was its necessity.  
 
Q.  And what was your attitude now toward the evacuation order? 
 
A. I was fully aware of the facts of this evacuation order on the 
population that I also knew that the execution of the evacuation would 
mean a considerable burden to the army.  In spite of this I had to obey 
the order.  Concerning the necessity of carrying out destructions, my 
opinions coincided with the opinions of the OKW.  It was a matter of 
course to me and everybody else that the destructions had to be barried 
out.  My opinion deviated from Hitler's opinion in 
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the beginning only in the one factor.  I did not think it was absolutely 
necessary to transfer the population to other areas but I could not close 
my eyes to Hitler's reasons of military necessity.  I could deny that 
they were justified.  Jodl warned me too.  He said this time I had better 
follow the evacuation order since Hitler insistedunder all circumstances 
that this order be carried out.  Furthermore, I knew -- and this is also 
contained in the OKW order -- that the most decisive factor in this whole 
affair was the Reich Commissar in Norway.  It was well know that he, this 
man, was very angry because the first evacuation order had not been 
carried out and bow he would closely supervise all activities of the 
Army.  It was therefore quite impossible not to obey this evacuation 
order.  Finally, I had to tell myself that it would possiblybe better for 
the population to be transferred to other areas rather than to spend the 
hard winter in the destroyed country.  I participated in bother winter 
battles in Russia.   Therefore, I know what flight from cold means.  I 
had to realize that the Russians, if the pushed up on us and if the 
confronted the choice of either saving themselves by using what remained 
in the way of shelter of sparing the population, it was certain that they 
would not spare the population.  Therefore, in the final analysis it was 
the best thing for the population that they were removed. 
 
Q.   You were talking about the Reich Commissar for Norway.  Will you 
give the name of this man, please? 
 
A.   His name was Terboven. 
 
Q.   That is the same Terboven whom you have already named? 
 
A.   Yes, he is. 
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Q.   General, what were the measures you ordered for the evacuation? 
 
A.   I have to say something else first.  The operation which had to be 
carried out by the army was possibly the most difficult land operation of 
the whole war.  During those days I said to my Chief of Staff: "If 
sometime after this war you have to train general staff officers, then 
you will have to make this operation a basis of the training because it's 
impossible to think of anything more difficult."  The army was spread 
over an area of 500 kilometers.  That is, it was spread over a wiser area 
than, for instance, the Allied forces in France and these forces were 
more than a million men strong.  The problem was to relieve this army out 
of an encirclement from three sides and that, in battle with a superior 
enemy.  Then this army would have to be concentrated on two highways and, 
finally, it would have to march along only one highway.  All that would 
have to be done on foot and in the Arctic winter.   That meant an 
enormous task for my staff, a more difficult task cannot be imagined.  I 
could not burden ir further with the extensive work concerning the 
evacuation.  Therefore, I formed a special staff for this operation -- 
that is, the evacuation. 
 
Q.   General, can you indicate to us on this map the area over which the 
Army was spread? 
 
A.   No, I am afraid I can't.  The whole eastern part is missing. 
 
Q.   You said the eastern part of that area is not contained on the map? 
 
A.   Yes, that is what I said. 
 
Q.   Did the evacuation staff receive definite directives? 
 
A.   It received certain instructions mainly with respect to cooperation 
with other agencies of the Wehrmacht 
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and with the Norwegian government.  I am afraid I don't know any details, 
that was the work of my Chief of Staff.  All I know is that I emphasized 
particularly that the evacuation had to be carried out with all the 
consideration for the population.  Around that time I had learned 
unofficially for some time that after the army had went back to Norway I 
was to take over the post of Commander-in-Chief ocer [sic] Norway and 
immediately after the evacuation order I received the official order for 
this transfer.  I attached the greatest importance to good relations 
between myself and the Norwegian population.  For this reason alone I 
insisted that the evacuation whould [sic] not give any cause for 
misgivings amongst the population.  You may also rest assured that if any 
kind of excuses became known to me, any unnecessary harshness or any 
inconsideration, I would have taken counter-measures immediately.  I was 
not a man who would let himself be prevented from carrying out his 
intentions by some action of a subordinate agency. 
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Q,  General, I will now have Document Book XXII shown to you.  Would you 
like to turn up page 1 in your book there which is also page 1 of the 
English text?  This is Document NOKW-1776.  It is Exhibit 500.  This is 
an excerpt from the OKW order to return to Norway for good.  Up to this 
date the army had been under instructions to remain in Northern 
Lapland.  This excerpt contains the order for the destruction of all 
installations which might be of use to the enemy.  Would you please look 
at the third paragraph?  There is it ordered that the able bodied 
population of Norway is to be taken along and to be put at the disposal 
of the Reich Commissioner for Labor Assignment.  I want to know from you 
whether this part of the order and the part of the next paragraph - that 
is, the carrying along of Finnish hostages - were these parts of the 
order carried out? 
 
A.   No. 
 
Q.  Would you continue, please? 
 
A.   The handing over of the able bodiespopulation [sic] to the Reich 
Commissioner for labor never actually took place.  That was an order 
issued from the "green table' which wasgiven [sic] without knowledge of 
the situation, and where carrying along of Finnish hostages is concerned 
I can only tell you that we laughed about this part of the order.  That 
was completely out of the question. 
 
Q.   Would you now in this same document book look at the following 
document which is Exhibit 501.  This is document NOKW-114.  It can be 
found pn page 3 of the German and page 4 of the English document 
book.  This is an order by the army addressed to the 19th Mountain Army 
Corps.  What was the purpose of this order and why was it necessary? 
 
A.   The order ordered the destructions in the so-called Potsame 
territory, this is the eastern area in Northern Lapland.  This area had 
to be coded by the Finns to Russia in 1944.  Today this are is Russian 
territory.  The order further states that reconnaissance has to be 
carried out concerning destructions in Norway.  These measures were a  
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matter of course, they did not have to be ordered. 
 
Q.   Now, General, would you like to have a look at the following 
document which is Exhibit 502.  You fin it on page 4 of the German 
document book and on page 6 of the English text.  This is Document NOKW-
097.  Here the Army makes certain applications and requests to the 
OKW.  Can youtell us why this was done? 
 
A.   On the 4thof October, the Army received the order to retreat to 
Norway.  This task required quite a number of preparatory measures as, 
for instance, the subordination of those troops in Finnmark which up to 
that date had been subordinate to the Commander-in-Chief for 
Norway. Further, there was another factor which I would like to point 
particularly.  An agreement was to be reached between the army and Navy 
High Command for Norway.  The Army did not ask for subordination but 
merely an instruction concerning cooperation and there was never any kind 
of subordination.  We cannot assume that the OKW would do more than the 
Army asked them to do.  Besides, in paragraph 4 we find the request to 
issue instructions concerning the destruction of the nickel works, 
Kelloskioki.  These instructions had to be given because after all these 
works were not under the army but under the armaments ministry.  Finally, 
in paragraph 5 there is a request to the effect that the Quartermaster 
General of the 20thMountain Army by appointed Evacuation Commissar.  I 
would like to point this out because the English word "evacuation" does 
mean evacuation, but had nothing to do with what we meant in that 
particular instance when we talked about the evacuation of the 
population.  This evacuation was not concerned with human beings, but 
only with the property of the armed forces.  Around this date, the 5thof 
October, there was no such thing as the evacuation order existed.   
 
Q.   Would you now look at the next exhibit which is 503?  You find it on 
page 6 of the German and page 8 of theEnglish [sic] document book.  This 
isdocument -- I beg your pardon-- I withdraw this remark.  It is -- I 
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have a correction in my book concerning the document number.  I shall 
mention the corrected document, No. 754-PS.  This document, General, is 
the Fuehrer order for the evacuation of population dated 28th of 
October.  You told us quite a number of things about the principles for 
this evacuation.  Now I would like you to give us once again your 
comments on this order, and I want to particularly stress the question of 
the difference between this order and the one previously given. 
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A.   In this order it is stated that Finnmark be evacuated and 
installations there be destroyed.  It can be seen from this order that 
the Reich Commissar was the man mainly respnsible for this order.  The 
military necessities are emphasized, the necessity for the evacuation, as 
well as the destruction.  There is one sentence which I would like to 
draw to your attention.  It is the last sentence in the second paragraph, 
and it reads: "Compassion for the civilian population is uncalled 
for."  This sentence should not be regarded as an invitation to take 
harsh measures.  It is to be understood in connection with the next 
sentence, which is the first sentence of the next passage, where it says, 
"The troops carrying out this order must be made to understand that 
within a few months the Norwegians will be thankful for having been save 
from Bolshevism etc., and that the whole operation is in the interest of 
the Norwegians."  It had to be expected that the people would be kind and 
would comply with the requests of individual Norwegians to exempt them 
from evacuation, and that these men would not know that thus they would 
face a deathly danger.  There is one think which I can add here, and that 
it that there was an oral explanation of this order to the effect that 
Hitler attached particular importance to the measures ordered for 
Finnmark because he counted on the Exile Government's landing and 
settling in Finnmark, if this area was left completely intact.  At this 
occasion I received the warning from Jodl which I have previously 
mentioned.  The warning was to the effect that this time I had better 
carry out the evacuation, and it was pointed out to me that the Reich 
Commissar played an important part in this affair. 
 
Q.   In order to clarify this complex, which was this evacuation 
order?  Was it the first or the second order? 
 
A.   This was the second evacuation order. 
 
Q.   Now, on this page o of your Document Book and on page 10 of the 
English Document Book XXII, you find a document under Exhibit No. 
504.  This is document No. NOKW-086.  This is the order issued by the 
Mountain 
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Army for the evacuation.  Would you, first of all, give us your comments 
on the distribution list? 
 
A.   Yes, this is my order, issued by me for the evacuation.  The 
distribution list shows the following: This was issued as an order to 
three corps.  They were the corps connected with the evacuation.  It went 
to the most southern corps for the information, this corps had no 
connection with the evacuation.  The fourth copy went for information 
purposes to the air Force and to the Navy.  These two agencies were not 
under the Army.  And it went for information to the Armed Forces 
Commander Norway and to the Reich Commissioner for Norway, and these two 
agencies were, of course, not subordinated to the Army either.   
 
Q.   General, would you now give us some individual comments on this 
order, particularly would you please answer the following question?  Is 
this order identical with Hitler's order? 
 
A.   This order was composed on the basis of Hitler's order, and of 
course, it is in the nature of things that it contains more details that 
Hitler's order did.  Under passages one and two, the communication which 
was given in Hitler's order isreproduced [sic], and i would like to say 
the following in this connection: According to our regulations point one 
of every order had to contain the enemy position.  Point two was to 
reproduce the order by the superior agency as literally as possible.  In 
this instance there wasno [sic] enemy and, therefore, the communication 
contained in the original order was reproduced in passages one and two as 
literally as possible.  Apart from this the order contains general 
directives for the carrying out of the evacuation.  There are a few 
details here which I would like to point out as, for instance, that only 
people able to carry out the marches are to be put on treks.  Therefore, 
the order was not given in the way it might be assumed from those papers 
which we received from Norway, that people were herded together and were 
just driven down Highway 50.  But instead it gives here quite a number of 
welfare measures for the benefit of the population.  These were  
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then explained in detail in the first evacuation orders of the Evacuation 
Staff which I signed myself.  This order is, unfortunately, not amongst 
these documents.  There is something I would like to point out from 
passage six, and that is that the ships which were used for the 
evacuation were property of the Reich Commissar,assit [sic] is expressed 
here.  There were quite a few disagreeable matters there as can be seen 
from the Norwegian documents, but the Army had no influence on these 
ships.  I would particularly like to emphasize passage seven.  This point 
states my intention and my wish for the evacuation to be carried out.  It 
says here, "I request all officessconcerned [sic] to carry out this 
evacuation in a sense of relief action for the Norwegian 
population.  Though there be necessities here and there to be severe all 
of us must attempt to save the Norwegians from Bolshevism and to keep 
them alive."  A person who orders something like this cannot desire 
cruelty and ruthlessness, but I am not in a position to put a general 
next to every lance corporal to make sure that the orders are carried out 
in a proper way.   
 
Q.   General, will you not please turn to the next exhibit - Exhibit No. 
505?  This is also contained in Document Book XXII, on Page 12 of the 
German text and pages 14 of the English text.  This document is numbered 
NOKW.48.  It is a "top secret" document.  Did you have anything to do 
with this matter, General? 
 
A.   This is an order by the OKW, addressed to the Supreme Commander of 
the Navy.  This order shows that the Commander in Chief of the Navy 
receivedthis order on the 30th of November 1944.  Therefore, this order 
had to be dated prior to that date, that is the 30th of November.  The 
order contains a number of directives and instructions to the Armed 
Forces Commanders in Norway and Denmark, concerning the achievement of 
several measures with the Reich Commissars.  All I wanted to say in this 
connection is that this order could not have anything to do with me 
because I did not become Armed Forces Commander for Norway until the 18th  
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of December of that year.  I neither gained knowledge of this order, not 
did I carry it out in any respect.   
 
Q  Would you now please turn to page 14 of  your Document Book, which is 
Page 16 of the English Document Book?  This is Exhibit 506, and the 
Document is No. NOKW-090.  General, this is the evacuation report 
"Hormann."  We did not want to go into the details of this report because 
it is known to everybody, but please turn to page 5 and have a look at 
paragraph 4, which is contained on that page.  There is some talk here 
about a shelling of village of Kjoalle, which is supposed to have been 
carried out by the units of the Navy?  Was there a relation of the 
subordination of the Navy under the XXth Mountain Army? 
 
A  No, the Navy was in no respect subordinate to the XXth Mountain 
Army.  This shelling of the village I cannot imagine, even on the basis 
of this report, could, at the best, have because known to me after the 
fact on the basis of this report, but I did not remember the incident 
conderned here.  I don't know what the report is talking about.  The 
Norwegian document show one incident where a Navy vessel fired on some 
people with machine guns, and one woman was killed on this 
occasion.  Maybe it is this incident that is meant here.  I don't know 
any details.  In any case, this naval unit was not subordinate to me.   
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Q.   We will not turn to Document Book XXIII.  Do you have the Document 
Book there, General?  Please turn to page 13 in your Document Book, which 
is page 12-- one, two, in the English text.  This is Exhibit 514, which 
is Document Norway 4.  It is a communication to the Corps Headquarters of 
the XXth Mountain Army.  Would you please give us your comments on this 
communication? 
 
A. A divisional commander comments here on the possibilities of the 
evacuation.  The letter is dated the 29th of October 1944.  It is strange 
that this communication has a receipt stamp of the XIXth Army Corps, 
dates teh 31stof December 1944.  The XIX Corps had been frequently on the 
move during that period, and I can only imagine that this communication, 
which is of no particular importance, for delayed and never actually, 
reached my knowledge. 
 
Q.   In this same Document Book would you please turn to page 30, which 
is page 28 of the English Document Book.  This is Document Norway 8, and 
it has been submitted bu the Prosecution as Exhibit 517.  It is a report 
dated the 4th of January 1945.  Will you briefly five us your comments 
please? 
 
A.   Is is a report from a dicision to the XIXth Corps.  This report did 
not go any further than the XIXth Corps, and, therefore, I did not gain 
knowledge of it.  The purpose of the report was to gather material to 
counteract the strong radio propaganda from abroad, directed against the 
so-called atrocities of the evacuation.  I can only say that I subscribe 
to every line of this report.  All I would like to point out particularly 
is page 2 of the report, which shows clearly that the town of Hammerfest 
was almost completely evacuated on the basis of voluntary 
applications.  On page 3, which is page 30 of the English text, it is 
pointed out that the BBC asked the Norwegian population not to comply 
with the evacuation order, but instead to withdraw into the valleys and 
there those people would have died.  In the next passage it is mentioned 
that one attempt had been made to find the people who had been left 
behind and that they were then evacuated.  There is some talk here about 
relief 
31 Oct. -M-JP-6-2-Stone  (Int. Schaffer) 
Court V, Case VII 
 
actons for those who had remained behind.  Of course those actions were 
reported in the Norwegian reports, but they were distorted by 
hatred.  The term "relief action" for this population was used in the 
same manner by the Norwegian witness here, General Dahl, because he too 
had exhausted all his activities in such relief actions for those parts 
of the population which had escaped the evacuation.  There is nothing 
else I have to say.   
 
Q.   General, this brings us to Exhibit 519, which is on page 54 of your 
Document and on page 60 -six, zero- of the English Document book.  This 
is Document Norway No. 10.  It is the proclamation to the population for 
evacuation which has been repeatedly mentioned here.  Who drafted this 
proclamation? 
 
A.   It was drafted by the Reich Commissar in Oslo.  My staff was asked 
by telephone for my agreement, and I was asked to sign my name on the 
document.  And, of course, I could not refuse this request, particularly 
since there is nothing illegal contained in this proclamation.  I would 
like to point out that the third passage of the proclamation has not been 
translated in the English document book and this passage reads as 
follows:  "The German occupation Authorities for this reason show 
themselves prepared to support the evacuation carried out by the 
Norwegian Government.  It will be supported with all means at the 
disposal of the German Agencies.   
 
Q.   Then, will you please turn to page 83 in your Document Book -- 
eight, three, which is 89-- eight, nine--of the English text.  This is 
Exhibit 522, Document Norway No. 13.  It is an Order of the Day where you 
make it known to the troops that you have taken over the post of the 
Commander in Chief of Norway.  You were charged with this order under 
Count 2.  Will you please give your comments on it? 
 
A.   Will, I don't see why I am charged with it.  All I do here is to 
announce to the troops and to the other command authorities that I have 
been made Armed Forces Commander of Norway, and it is a matter of course 
that this be done.  In such orders, which are rather formal, it is  
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common usage to conclude then with, "Long Live the Fuehrer."  That is 
done in all countries. I don't see what is interesting in this. 
 
Q.   Now, let us turn to Exhibit 512, which on page 5 of the German text 
and page 4 of the English text if this Document Book.  The Document is 
Norway No. 2.  This is a report by a police official in Vedsos.  Did you 
ever gain knowledge of things mentioned in this document? 
 
A.   No, I never gained knowledge of them.  The action described here 
seems to be identical with the shelling by the Naval units, which we 
mentioned in the report "Hormann," but apart from that there is nothing I 
can say about this whole document. 
 
Q.   General, in this context there is one other question which has been 
touched upon earlier.  What became known to you at actions during 
evacuation which might be objected to? 
 
A.   Reports of the troops did not bring anything of this kind to my 
knowledge, and practically that could not be expected of them 
either.  But the British Radio, the Russian radio, the Swedish radio, and 
the Swedish press did bring certain incidents to my attentions.  All 
kinds of things were assorted in these reports, and I had every single 
assertion followed up.  I intended to take a large-scale countermeasure 
against such excesses if the really had occurred, but all these 
assertions turned out to be mere inventions, or else they were matters in 
which neither the Army not the troops had been guilty. I would like to 
give an example. 
 
THE PRESIDENT:Just a minute.  We'll take our morning recess at this 
time.  
 
(A RECESS WAS TAKEN) 
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THE MARSHAL:The Tribunal is again in session. 
 
THE PRESIDENT:You may continue, Dr. Fritsch. 
 
BY DR. FRITSCH: 
 
Q.   General, first of all we have dealt with the military documents 
concerning Norway and now we are dealing with some documents which I 
would like to describe as civilian ones.  Before the recess I asked you 
what you have to say about objectionable occurrences in connection with 
the carrying out of the evacuation and you stated that in particular you 
received information about these things from the foreign press but that 
these reports were either terribly exaggerated or else distorted.  Now I 
would like you to continue with describing these things.  Please, would 
you do so. 
 
A.   I just wanted to quote and example of Russian propaganda.   The 
Russian radio reported when the Russian troops came into the neighborhood 
of Kirkones they found Norwegians living in cases, norwegians who ere 
sick and had no medications, etc. and they added that in such a condition 
the Germans left the Norwegians behind, but to this I could only say that 
people concerned were people who had resisted being evacuated and they 
had arrived in this condition through their own fault.  Another report 
was in the Swedish press.  Some Norwegians were found frozen to death in 
the Swedish-Norwegian frontier area.   They had insufficient clothing and 
had marched through the mountains and so were frozen to death.  These 
were clearly people who did not want to be evacuated and had resolved by 
themselves to find their way to Sweden and against this too the Army was 
powerless; and then the Swedish press brought a reportabout the fact that 
during the evacuation the Germans carried out such ruthless destruction 
that they set a house on fire in which there was old men and the name of 
locality was also given.  In order to get this straight I ordered an 
investigationunder military law.  This was carried out by the XIX Corps 
and in all details, it was shown clearly that no house had been set on 
fire unless it have been previously searched in all corners, In this way 
the 
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propaganda accusations went on, but not in one single case did I find any 
justified reason.   
 
Q.   General, please turn to page 19 of the document book XXIII, English 
page 17; this is document No. 516.  Excuse me, Exhibit No. 516.  This 
contains a report of the City Engineer of Hammerfest which has been 
accepted here for whatever probative value it may have.  In this 
connection I am only interested to know when Hammerfest was destroyed. 
 
A.   From the report it can be seen that the destruction started at the 
beginning of November, and that in January and February the destruction 
continued. 
 
Q.   Now with regard to the last document we are going to deal with here, 
this is Exhibit No. 521, German page 68, and English page 71.  It is 
document No. 12.  This document contains a calculation of the war damages 
in Finmark. Can you please comment briefly to this question. 
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A.   In order to comment on the war damages, of course, there is of 
course, the masis missing the basic documents.  From this report it can 
be assumed however, that some items contain the total war damages and 
then that the original damage figures were even increased in later 
corrections.  From these eports it can also be seen that in Norway until 
the preparation for this trial tarted, [sic, ‘s' to faint to see on 
image] nobody thought about these damages at all, and therefore these 
calculations bear the characteristic of great speed and superfluity, and 
from the date it can also be seen that these calculations were very 
quickly made for the purpose of this trial, and I think that these facts 
spear for themselves. 
 
Q.   And now a few general questions; until when were you Commander in 
Chief in Norway? 
 
A.   Until January 13, 1945. 
 
Q.   And then where did you go? 
 
A.   Then I had the supreme command of Army Group North during the battle 
in East PRussia.  
 
Q.   And then later on you took over Army Group South, when was that? 
 
A. Before that I had Army Group Kurland in the 6th Kurland battle, and 
last of all I was in charge of Army Group South. 
 
Q.   Army Group South was in operation against whom? 
 
A.   Army Group South was in operation against the Russians in the areas 
between Czechslovakia and Yugoslavia, and later on individual units 
fought against the Americans, who came from the rear , from the West into 
the back of the Army Group.   
 
Q.   And when did you cease hostilities? 
 
A. I stopped fighting on the 7th of May, 0900 hours, and this was against 
the Americans, and then I gave the order to the four armies of the Army 
Group that on the evening of the 7th they should withdraw from the 
Russian front, and they should retreat towards the west. 
 
Q.   And with which American General did you negotiate? 
 
A.   I negotiated with General Walker, the Commanding General of the 
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20th American Tank Corps, deputizing for General Patton, the Commander in 
Chief of the 3rdAmerican Army. 
 
Q. And then when were you made a prisoner of war? 
 
A. On the 7th of May I gave myself up as a prisoner of war to the 
Americans. 
 
Q. What are you now? 
 
A. I am convinced that I am still a prisoner of war.   
 
Q.   And did you sign a statement to the effect that you were in 
agreement with your release from being a prisoner of war? 
 
A. No, it wasn't like that.  I signed the release certificate at the 
beginning of January together with 5 or 6 other officers.  We gave the 
signature only under the threat of disciplinary measures if we should 
refuse to sign.  The signatures were given under protest. 
 
DR. FRITSCH:Your Honors, at the moment I have no further questions on 
direct examination to the witness.  I have had the intentionto submit at 
this point the documents which I still have to submit, and these 
documents were promised me by the Translating Division for this morning, 
but I just heard that they won't be ready until this evening, and 
therefore I would like to place the witness at the disposal of the 
prosecution for cross-examination. 
 
[....] 
